"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  The tank company he refers to as being attached to 1/4 cav was D company 1/11 cav.  He wrote: 

It was the day after the attack on FSB Doc, and the day before our attack into the Michelin.

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Confirmation: I said in the preceding day's commentary that I believed Division had given the order to pull out of the Michelin, and that was why we couldn't finish blowing the bunkers on the 25th. My subsequent reading of the division after action report confirms this:

"Much of the 1st Division success in Operation Atlas Wedge can be traced to the decision to remove all forces from the Michelin temporarily in order to permit the Plantation to fill again with the enemy. The enemy did, in fact, move back into the Plantation on the heels of the US departure, thus allowing himself to be once again fixed in location. . . . In connection with the enemy's return to the Michelin, the 1-4 Cav felt, in retrospect, that destruction of fortifications in the Michelin prior to the initial departure would have enhanced their success on return. On their return they found the enemy had reoccupied many of the same bunkers from which he had originally been evicted."

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Atlas Wedge, Day 12, 29 March 1969

At 0049 we get resupply confirmations: Mission #55 for us is 3 sorties at 0715. Mission #56 is 8 sorties at 1400. Mission #57, 1 sortie at 0715 is for signal personnel. (I suspect that this was to beef up Division's signal unit they had at FSB Doc, probably monitoring enemy radio traffic in the Michelin.) These missions are flown by CH-34 Chinooks, the workhorse of the division's 1st Aviation Battalion.

At 0702 I request the 3rd Bde commander, Colonel Haldane, to fly out to Doc to confer with me if possible. No doubt this had to do with planning for the attack on the 30th. At 0852 I want the XO at Di An to check on impact awards and see if the Chaplain can come out to Doc for memorial services for our dead of the preceding day. I have sent B and C Troops and part of A/2-28 on local RIFs in different directions out of Doc. They find a discarded AK47 from the attack on Doc, a dud artillery round, a 500 pound bomb and a mortar round which they blow, and blood trails and drag marks from the attack which causes us to report 12 possible enemy KIA in addition to the body count of 10. By 1410 B Troop is back at Doc. Sidewinder (the Air Force Forward Air Controller} and Darkhorse choppers do aerial reconnaissance for us. I probably get a LOH and have another look, but this is not recorded. An AO extension is approved to accommodate our planned maneuver for the morning. The log for the next day indicates we had planned phase lines, times, and directions of attack. Considerable coordination goes into a planned exercise, and we all were probably looking at our maps, conferring with one another, pulling maintenance, checking our basic loads, and topping off our vehicles.

Late in the morning we had been told we would receive "Tabs B/1-18 at Doc approx. 1230." This sounds as if we are getting opcon of B Company, 1-18 Infantry Battalion (straightleg), and that "Tabs" is their battalion call sign. We had been told very late on the preceding evening that D Company, 11th ACR (minus one platoon) would be joining us in the afternoon between 1300 and 1500. Are they bringing with them one platoon of B/1-28? There is no mention in the log of a full company, or of closure of the infantry or the tank company on Doc. When the nighttime locations are entered in the log at 1900, D/1-11 and the infantry platoon are RONing together 3 km east of DOC on Boundary Road. I do not believe I would have had them RON so far away when I needed them for the attack in the morning. Had they even been briefed on my plan? For now, in absence of memory of what happened, I have to speculate. Perhaps they were delayed in their march and could not close Doc before dark. Boundary Road was no place to be traveling after dark unless in extreme emergency, so maybe I decided to have them RON short of Doc and I would brief the company commander on the fly the next morning when the operation was underway. On the other hand, 3 km more to travel at dusk doesn't seem like a great distance when you consider the advantages of having them RON with you at Doc and talk about this important mission face to face.

One other possibility is that in fact D Company 1-11 ACR closed early in the afternoon as programmed and picked up the infantry platoon which had been flown in. Perhaps after briefing the commander, Captain Wyse, I sent the company back down Boundary Road so it might appear we had intentions to move out in that direction instead of into the Michelin. By now there was a lot of armor in and near Doc, and the enemy of course was monitoring us as best they could. At this point I can only speculate. Maybe the simplest answer is that the location was incorrectly entered into the log.

The move in the morning initially is to be C Troop leading, then B Troop, then D/1-11 headed north and west. Much of D (Air) is again to be opcon to us

Apparently "Baton" is D/1-11 ACR's call sign. I must have been concerned about them and told Charlie Troop to keep close radio contact with them because at 2055, Jim Selsor tells our TOC that if Baton fails to give 15 minute sitreps to notify him immediately.

The day was not a strenuous one in terms of movement. We spent much of it preparing for the following day, as Doc McGeady's journal shows:

29 March. "Stand down today. Got to wash in stream & rest & regroup & impact awards. 25 (& myself) given BSM with V device. Don't feel too courageous knowing how easily this award is conferred."

(Steve can take it from me, 32 years later to the day, that he and all the others who got them richly deserved their awards for their actions during the attack on Doc.)

At 2400 the log is closed. The next day, 30 March, beginning at daylight and lasting all day and into the next, we will fight the largest battle during my command.